Review of Rushkoff's Nothing Sacred

Review of Douglas Rushkoff's Nothing Sacred: The Truth About Judaism

As a general rule, one should always worry when someone tells you they are going to tell you the truth - even when that someone is Douglas Rushkoff. Rushkoff is one of the modern geniuses of the study of the media and our relation to it. His earlier works were not just books, but events in the study of society. So when he writes a book about Judaism, even one with such a suspicious title, it behooves us to take notice.

The book starts out giving us Rushkoff's view of what Judaism is. For him, it can be boiled down to three, and only three things: 1) iconoclasm 2) monotheism, and 3) social justice. He demonstrates this by giving us selective examples of all three from the bible and Jewish literature and history. Then, in chapter two, he goes on to ask how Judaism "lost it", or lost our focus on the above three goals. He is especially concerned about loosing Judaisms iconoclasm which was a product of open, free, and supported rational inquiry. Basically he blames contemporary Jewish practice for stifling this inquiry. He claims that we have replaced openness (and pluralism) with dogma and insularity.

Chapter three then claims that there is a long history of improvements as the process of renaissances. Moreover, he integrates this well inside of the Jewish tradition. The book then argues for an "open source Judaism" which will allow us to see things more multi-dimensionally. He then advocates a sort of abandonment of tradition such as to allow the important stuff in Judaism, ie, social justice and iconoclasm, to flourish, even at the expense of everything else.

There is then a sort of digression to stave off the objection that Judaism is a race and therefore ought to be preserved as one. The chapter claims it is not a race, but something else. Therefore he concludes that it is then OK to share Judaism's core values with others, even if it means we all become the same (ie, we assimilate ourselves and our values for the sake of perpetuating Judaism's core memes of iconoclasm and social justice.)

The fifth chapter is more normative. It enjoins us to establish a collective narrative. It insists on open exchanges and constant critical dialogue. The chapter asserts that everything is open to reinterpretation. The idea is that we should strive to reinterpret the old narratives as openly as possible. Rushkoff goes on to then say that to do this we need access to the original texts and their original contexts. Instead of seeing our places in Judaism as a link in the long process of Judaism, what we need to do is to take the original Judaism and imagine we are the first interpreters, and ours is the generation that it ought to be interpreted for. Then we will be able to take the original vales and apply it to today and it will be meaningful to us, and will promote Judaism's true values.

My problems with the book are many, and I will state a few of them here. (1) First, and this is a pet peeve of mine - one should not think they can successfully get away with reverse engineering Judaism to discover its core values. It is both the book's premise and its conclusion, that there are core values and that they were figured out. The task is always dangerous because there is no way to be right and no way to be wrong. Generally people know what they want the answer to be and find the examples they need to get to it. If I had every book whose opening chapter told me what the author thought the real "essence" of Judaism was, I would have an enormous Judaica collection. For some it is saving the whales, for other the ecology, for others it is serving God, for some it is about bring the messiah, honoring your ancestors, voting democrat, entertaining the world, singing, or smoking marihuana. I have never bought in to any of those and I don't buy it now. The three core values for Rushkoff iconoclasm, monotheism, and social justice are interesting choices, but sound very agenda-laden especially since monotheism (all theism, actually) seems to get lost over the course of the book. Moreover, iconoclasm seems like it was a good stepping stone for monotheism. Monotheism does seem important and probably was one of the main goes somewhere along the line. And, social justice is clearly anachronistic. There is certainly an ancient idea of making the world better for the Jews, and even of making the world better (though that must have come later). But it seems odd to put that as a main goal. There are enough references to "l'takin olam bemalchut shaddai" (to fix the world within the kingdom of heaven) to suggest that there is an idealist conception of a Jewish reaching out to spread word and practice of our God to the world, and this is taken up by some, but this cannot be generalized to social justice. Moreover the name itself is very anachronistic. The term "social justice" congers up images of Jewish-lefty-bundist-arbiter-ring-style social thought. This could hardly have been the intension of whoever first uttered "tikkun olam".

(2) Why stick with social justice any more than anything else? Perhaps we should stick with the kosher laws, or the family purity laws, or the holiday laws. Maybe we should make up our own laws, call that Judaism, in the "very Jewish tradition of free inquiry" and promote those? Under the books understanding of Judaism anything can really be construed as Judaism. And if we are allowing that what does Judaism really have to do with this. If we happen to like a value, what is the point of talking about its authentically Jewish nature? If it is to convince Jews that this is authentic Judaism then you are only going to interest those who are interested in Judaism's original message and those who are interested in your message. Those who are interested in yours do not need Judaism, and those who are interested in the authentic message do not need to be Jews if the message is worthwhile enough.

(3) There have been many trinities in Judaism, by the way. Many look like good candidates. The book's is just as arbitrary as many of the others, it seems. Is there an argument to suggest one over the other? Here are a few: Rav Kook: Jewish Torah, Jewish State, and Jewish people. Big three prohibitions: Idolatry, adultry, murder. Rosh Hashana: Repentance, Prayer, Charity. Jewish Characteristics: modesty, mercifulness, kindness. The pillars of the world: Torah, avoda (service), kindness.

(4) I am very bothered by the book's tone with regard to tradition. Personally I am not a believer in anything. I am barely a practicer of anything, nor am I secretly pleased that there are some out there who carry on "authentic" feeling Judaism. I do things within Judaism that I feel like, and that please me. That's about it. However, it seems like, by sounding so hostile towards tradition, the book disregards one of its own messages of open inquiry. Open inquiry does not mean something that is open only to those who already have the right answer. It is like an open democracy where they only allow one candidate to run, or at the very least, they outlaw some of the candidates. Inquiry, or at least its promotion, is not present if you assert a priori, which answers you will not allow to turn up at the end.

(5) There is an assumption that seems to lurk in the pages that IF one is Jewish, THEN they feel as if they must support Israel. I personally do, but I do not think that one must to be Jewish, or that it is necessary or important for one's Judaism. Judaism has allowed for a multitude of voices on this since the times of Herzl.

(6) Much of the information from this book seems like it was gleaned from the pages of modern new age pop-culture books with trendy titles, and authors who appear on Oprah. (Like Drosnin et al) There seems to be little first-hand familiarity with the workings of the Jewish canon. The corpus of Jewish writing is extensive. To call it multi-faceted would be a massive understatement. Traditional Orthodox interpretation and reinterpretation allows a very wide latitude in reading of the text, especially the kind that Rushkoff seems to innovate here. Few Orthodox Jews would find it hard to look at the 10 plagues and see it as casting off 10 idols. Biblical criticism is at least two millennia older that Spinoza. And Spinoza knew it. Spinoza was following a well worn methodology and style, only his answer was radically different - not his questions. (Hobbes actually got the jump on Spinoza on the biblical criticism question anyway.)

There is a much more obvious reading of Maimonides' Mishne Torah that Rushkoff misses, which makes the exact opposite point that the book is making. Maimonides on one very important level strove to CLOSE discussion on Jewish law. The talmud is a work with lots of stuff in it. There are stories, legends, parables, discussions, gossip, textual analysis, philosophy, and discussions about Jewish law. The discussions have ambiguities, open questions, many more points of view then actually get full treatment, and their inclusion is conscious on the part of the editors of the Talmud. So much was deliberately left open ended to allow for a reinterpretation. Moreover, those familiar with the story of the oven of Achnai, know that the rabbis made sure that the law is not fixed in heaven, but rather open to their constant revisions and reinterpretations. The Talmud is VERY clear about the living nature of the law. There are also few final pronouncements thus allowing for many possible loopholes and interpretations, and directions that can be taken from the text itself.

One can even argue that in that way the talmud is very philosophical rather than dogmatic. It records all the arguments and reasons, rather then the law itself. What is important for the editors of the Talmud, what they needed to preserve for eternity is the debate - regardless of what the outcome or practice is.

Maimonides sought to replace all that with a simple, closed, and fixed text from which you can get all law. Gone was the discussion. Gone was the idea that critical inquiry was valuable. Now all one needed was to see what Maimonides said the final ruling was and you had Jewish law. Maimonides goal was to replace dialogue with dogma. This was done for the masses as well as the intellectual. However for the intellectual there was an elaborate and sophisticated justification of this in the Guide for the Perplexed where obstacles to the first project were removed.

(7) There are a few places where the book makes assertions about Jews that reflect only on those Jews least in need of the program it is advocating (ie the educated and practicing). There are pronouncements for example that the Shabetai Zevi story was "erased from our history". This is preposterous. Everyone with a halfway decent Jewish education knows this. Certainly anyone who spent enough years in Hebrew school or read a few Jewish books in her life. It was a central part of Jewish history. The only way you could not know about him is 1) if you spent too few years in Hebrew School, 2) you do not remember what you were taught in Hebrew school, 3) you went to a Hebrew school where the teachers were not more educated then the students, or 4) you read zero books on Jewish history.

(8) The issue of race comes up a lot in the book, as if for some reason it came as a big revelation to the author that Jews do not see themselves as a product of a race. Israeli society is plagued with racism (discovering this was actually one of the biggest disillusiong moments of my life). WASPs (White Ashkenazi Sabras with Protectsia) are higher up on the social ladder than the Arab or north African Jews, and they both see themselves as higher than the Yemenite, or black Ethiopian Jews. But they all see each other as Jews. Jews of different races, yes, but Jews nonetheless. (Initially there was much debate of their Ethiopian Jews, but what was at issue was their linage as Jews, not their race. Everyone, except for a bunch of anti-Semites knows that Jews are not a race, the existence of race itself is hotly debated among those in the know, but it is not clear why so much time is spent debunking this.

The reason why he deals with race at all is that he makes the dubious claim that only Jews, ie the Jewish race should feel so special such that they should share their religion with others. It is not like anyone thinks that having non-Jews do some Jewish things is wrong. What is wrong if non-Jews give charity, or celebrate the Passover or whatever?

(9) I really do like the final chapter of the book. That is the chapter that recommends a fresh approach to looking at Judaism. I believe that it is not original in the sense that there are long traditions of modifying services and rituals, and textual interpretation to accommodate the times. The Orthodox do it, as do the unaffiliated and everyone in between, but it does promote a large awareness of what is going on, which I like.

It would be nice to see a more tolerance for different voices, not just the "correct" one. The correct voice, if there is one, that is the voice that is most appropriate for the time, will, as Rushkoff puts it, naturally emerge from the multitude of voices that speak out on every topic. Beyond that it is hard to imagine what the correct voice is. It cannot be the original intention in the original context, because we do not share their world, so their world view is useless. We also do not share their priorities, and you would have to make a good case for why we should before you do. So it has to just be the interpretation that works best for us here and now. But there is nothing that says that there is a unique correct interpretation. A central principle of Talmudic hermeneutics is "eilu v'eilu divrei elohim chaim". "Both these and those are the words are the living God." There are lots of things that count as the right interpretation. It behooves us to find them all, no doubt.

There are also numerous smaller problems in the book most of which I shall not deal with. However the problems range from the factual like Napolean's death had little to do with the status of the Jews, and the last Czar was incorrect in the book, and the Russians wrote The Protocols not the French - To the very strange misrepresentations of the Hebrew language (YHWH and avoda, for examples). Also, while "oz" does indeed mean "strength" in Hebrew, the Uzi was named after its inventor Uziel Gal (nicknamed "Uzi"). And there is an annoying caveat pertaining to nomenclature, but I feel a need to point it out: Shabetai Zevi is never referred to as Zevi in the scholarly or Jewish literature. Nor is Rabbi Nathan of Gaza referred to simply as "Rabbi Nathan".

In closing, it is not clear what in the book is supposed to be innovative. The theology and scholarly methodology is used in everywhere in the Jewish world from the hassidic yeshiva, to the secular university, where everything from source-critical apparatus to mystical interpretations are employed, often side-by side. Sometimes the goal is to find the original intent of the author, sometimes the intent is to translate it in to modern lessons. Sometimes it is filtered through the lens of scores of generations, sometimes it is brand new commentary straight from the original. The book's values are nice, though they seem more to try to fit social justice and iconoclasm in to a Jewish mold rather than to take them out of one. There are equally plausible cases that could be made for Judaism's conservative nature than its iconoclastic one. There are also easily made cases that Jews were more interested in themselves than saving nations that they were planning on being a light to.

But, on a more positive note, I really do love the "open source" metaphor for Jewish inquiry. The open source philosophy blurrs the boundary between creator and user which was, by the way the original reason that the oral law was oral - so as not to become rigidified on a text. Traditional software generally has one creator, and the program is static. The user then has to deal with whatever software she is given. Open source allows the user to modify the software as she needs to. There is nothing sacred about the source code. The source code is not copy protected with all the security and legal apparatus that usually comes with it. Open source Judaism also encourages each individual to make any contribution that he wants. Popular tweaks will be picke up by others and catch on. Of course it is innately difficult to modify the source code. To do so you must first have a good understanding of the original intent and language of the source. You can't modify the code if you don't understand the program. With Judaism you can only make a change if you are perceived as understanding it. Illiterate Jews cannot really impact the religion. Who would listen? (Though there have been a few possible exceptions.)

While this is a wonderful metaphor, it is hardly a new concept. Judaism, like other religions can be well described by the open source terminology and can be modeled within the rubric of open source philosophy. There was an initial program. This Kernel (a core of the program protected by some administrator that is accepted as cannonical) was a general program (whatever that was). The "protector" of the kernel was pretty conservative. Each generation adds its own features and changes and modifies it, and the popular ones are picked up by all and the unpopular ones are discarded. The whole process has being going on in Jewish law since the beginning, and even those who think that strictly Orthodox Judaism has never done that would do well to read the historians of Halacha (say Jacob Katz's Divine Law in Human Hands or The Shabbos Goy or more importantly the Soloveitchik "Rupture and reconstruction" paper of a few years ago). On a larger scale, Diaspora Judaism itself has fractured in to three major groups, and Israeli Judaism has taken up Zionism and other "denominations". Each rift can be easily modeled as a new step in the evolution of the Judaism program. There are many ways to use the open source concept to describe these.

But either way, the book is a fresh reminder of the value of a Jewish education and the benefits of a healthy debate in Jewish practice and theology. Debate is vital to the tradition, and Rushkoff should be commended for taking such a decisive stand in it.